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resource development with minimal environmental impacts. Long-
range planning is the mandate of NEPA that has been ignored because
of the initial high cost to governmental agencies in traditional terms of
agency output. In the long run, however, this command of NEPA
should provide the impetus for the most effective resource management
program possible.
ELIZABETH GORDON MCCRODDEN
Interstate Commerce-A Shipper's Remedy for Discrimination
Prohibited by the Motor Carrier Act
Section 216(d)I of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935' (Part II of the
Interstate Commerce Act) makes it unlawful for a regulated3 carrier
to subject a shipper "to any unjust discrimination."4 There have been
few cases in which the federal judiciary has been required to interpret
the nondiscrimination language contained in section 216(d) and thus
it has remained a relatively obscure provision of a major federal regula-
tory act. However, the recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.6
may signal the emergence of section 216(d) as an important weapon
in the legal arsenal of shippers. In this case of first impression,
the Fourth Circuit, relying exclusively on the reasoning of cases
interpreting a similar provisionr of the Federal Aviation Act of
1. 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970).
2. Id. §§ 301-327.
3. Some motor carriers, including school busses, taxicabs and farm vehicles, are
excluded from the Act's coverage. Id. § 303(b).
4. Id. § 316(d). This section provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable
preference.or advantage to any particular person, port, gateway, locality, re-
gion, district, territory, or description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or
to subject any particular person, port, gateway, locality, region, district, terri-
tory, or description of traffic to any unjust discrimination or any undue or un-
reasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever ....
5.' See note 33 infra for a discussion of the cases that have interpreted section
216(d)'s prohibition of discriminatory conduct.
6. 540 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1976).
7. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970). This section provides:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality,
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1958,8 found that an implied damage remedy' is available to a shipper
for a carrier's breach of its statutory duty of nondiscrimination. 10 More-
over, the court decided that in a proper case punitive damages can
be assessed against the breaching carrier."
Plaintiffs in Hubbard, a law professor and his wife, had contracted
with defendant motor carrier to have their furniture picked up at New
Haven, Connecticut and delivered to Columbia, South Carolina by a
certain date.' Most of the furniture was delivered approximately
three weeks after the date specified by the contract while the remain-
der arrived eleven weeks overdue.' 3 Plaintiffs brought suit in federal
district court' 4 alleging that defendant had violated its section 216(d)
duty of nondiscrimination by using its facilities to transport the goods
"of other unknown persons instead of plaintiffs' goods . . . ."15 They
further alleged'6 that this was done "in a reckless, wilfull, and wanton
manner" and sought $25,000 in actual and punitive damages.17 De-
ar description of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or sub-
ject any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air trans-
portation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
8. Id. §§ 1301-1542.
9. The phrase "implied damage remedy" is used in this Note to mean the implica-
tion of a private cause of action from a statute not expressly providing one in favor of
the plaintiff.
10. 540 F.2d at 1226.
11. Id. at 1229. The Fourth Circuit also held that damages for mental distress
could be recovered in an action brought under section 216(d) of the Motor Carrier Act.
Id. at 1230. See note 16 infra.
12. 540 F.2d at 1225.
13. Id. The date named in the contract was July 18, 1973. Eighty percent of the
furniture was delivered on August 8, 1973 and the remaining twenty percent on October
10, 1973.
14. Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., No. 74-1819 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 1975) (unre-
ported).
15. 540 F.2d at 1226.
16. Plaintiffs also alleged a right to recover damages for mental distress. They
argued that defendant's conduct forced them to delay setting up their new home and
thereby caused them to suffer compensable anxiety. Id. at 1225. The district court
granted defendant's motion to strike all mention of damages for mental distress from
the complaint on the grounds that recovery of such damages was precluded by the Car-
mack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970), see note 74 and text accompanying notes
74-77 infra, and by the fact that there was no precedent for an award of damages for
mental distress for delay in shipping property. Order of the Dist. Ct., No. 74-1819, re-
produced in-Brief for Appellant at 7a; see 540 F.2d at 1226. The Fourth Circuit vacated
this order, holding that damages for mental distress due to delay in shipment are recov-
erable and that plaintiffs should have been allowed to take this question to the jury. The
controlling inquiry, according to the court, was whether the claim could withstand "'a
careful scrutiny of the evidence supporting [it]'" and not be considered trivial or ficti-
tious. 540 F.2d at 1229 (quoting W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRTs § 12, at 51 (1971)).
17. Id. at 1226.
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fendant's preanswer motion to strike from the complaint the portion
that described its conduct as reckless, wilfull and wanton was granted by
the district court's on the ground that recovery of punitive damages for
injury to property was precluded by the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 9 a common law case. An
agreed stipulation of actual damages was entered as judgment. 20
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the order of the district
court and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 In so doing,
the court found it necessary to face a threshold issue that the district
court had not perceived as an obstacle to recovery: whether plaintiffs
had a cause of action against defendant on the basis of section
216(d).22 Following a line of cases holding that section 404(b) of
the Federal Aviation Act23 implies a private damage remedy in favor
of a passenger who is denied his confirmed reservation on an airline
flight, 24 the Fourth Circuit concluded that a remedy is similarly implied
by section 216(d).2 5 On the question of punitive damages, the court
again adopted the reasoning of the Federal Aviation Act cases, holding
that punitive damages are a possibility in the section 216(d) action and
that plaintiffs should have been allowed to take their evidence of mali-
cious conduct to the jury.2 6 The court rejected the contention of
defendant that the Carmack Amendment, 7 a limitation of liability pro-
vision contained in Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act28 that is
applicable to motor carriers but not to air carriers,29 prevents the
recovery of punitive damages.30 The Fourth Circuit also dismissed
18. Order of the Dist. Ct., reproduced in Brief for Appellant at 7a.
19. 374 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967). This case held that a shipper could not recover
punitive damages in an action for destruction of the shipper's furniture by the carrier.
Id. at 137.
20. 540 F.2d at 1226. This stipulation included "out-of-pocket expenses and dam-
ages for loss and breakage of property. ... "- Id.
21. id. at 1230.
22. Id. at 1226.
23. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970). Section 404(b) is codified at id. § 1374(b).
24. See note 52 and text accompanying notes 52-59 infra for a discussion of these
cases.
25. 540 F.2d at 1226.
26. Id. at 1229.
27. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970). See note 74 and text accompanying notes 74-
77 infra.
28. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-300 (1970). Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act deals gen-
erally with the regulation of railroads.
29. Id. § 319. This section incorporates the Carmack Amendment into Part II
(motor carriers) of the Interstate Commerce Act. There is no similar provision with
respect to the Federal Aviation Act.
30. 540 F.2d at 1228.
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Chandler31 as inapplicable because it "was an action based on the com-
mon law liability of a carrier for damage to goods in transit, not a dis-
crimination case brought under [section 216 (d)].
32
Since Hubbard was a case of first impression, there was no body
of case law interpreting the antidiscrimination provision of section
216(d) upon which the court could have based its holding."3 There-
fore, in order to place this decision in the appropriate perspective, it
is necessary to examine both the test developed by the courts to deter-
mine when it is proper to imply a private cause of action under a fed-
eral statute and the cases that have dealt with this question in the con-
text of other provisions of the Motor Carrier Act and section 404(b)
of the Federal Aviation Act. In regard to the issue of punitive dam-
ages, the section 404(b) cases and the interpretation of the Carmack
Amendment constitute the relevant background.
A private damage remedy was first implied from a federal statute
in 1916 in Texas & Pacific Railroad v. Rigsby,34 a case in which the
United States Supreme Court enunciated a broadly inclusive test for
implication. The Court held that a cause of action arose by implication
when a member of "the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted" was damaged as a result of a violation of the statute.35 Since
1916 this test has been subject to a series of modifications and obfusca-
tions36 that have successively restricted 7 and broadened 8 the applica-
31. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
32. 540 F.2d at 1229.
33. Although the court stated: "We have found no case discussing the issue of
whether a private damage remedy will lie for breach of the duty imposed by this sec-
tion," id. at 1226, there is at least one case that has considered this issue. Lyons v.
Illinois Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951), held that a black woman
who was forced to give up her seat and move to the rear of the bus had an action under
section 216(d) for the physical injuries she suffered. Id. at 534. This case has not
been widely cited and, because of the difference in factual bases, should not be consid-
ered as a possible precedent for the holding in Hubbard. Another case, Merchandise
Warehouse Co. v. A.B.C. Freight Forwarding Corp., 165 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. Ind. 1958),
discussed section 216(d) in regard to discrimination and held that plaintiff had a cause
of action against a freight forwarder (who was regulated by section 216(d)) for his re-
fusal to cross picket lines at plaintiff's place of business and deliver goods. It is unclear,
however, whether the action was based on section 216(d) or the common law.
34. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
35. Id. at 39.
36. See generally Comment, Private Rights of Action under Amtrak and Ash:
Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1393-97 (1975).
37. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Public Serv. Co., 341
U.S. 246 (1951), which found that the implication of a private damage remedy was im-
proper when the express provisions of the statute were limited to prospective relief.
38. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), which held that a pri-




bility of the implication doctrine. In Cort v. Ash,39 the Supreme Court
clarified the state of the doctrine and indicated a move in the direction
of the more restrictive view of when a private right of action is
implied.4 0  The Court held that a stockholder does not have an implied
cause of action against the directors of a corporation for violation of
a federal statute41 that prohibits dispersal of corporate funds in connec-
tion with a federal election.42 In reaching this conclusion the Court
outlined the relevant pattern of inquiry in deciding the question of
implication as: 1) whether the statute was enacted especially to benefit
a class of which plaintiff is a member; 2) whether there was an expres-
sion of legislative intent that a private damage remedy be implied or
denied; 3) whether such a remedy is "consistent with the legislative
scheme"; and 4) whether the action involved is one more appropriately
left to the states.4
Although section 216(d)'s prohibition of unjust discrimination has
not been conclusively interpreted, another provision of the same section
of the Motor Carrier Act has been examined by the Supreme Court.
In T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States,44 the Court held that the language
of section 216(d) making it unlawful for a carrier to charge unjust
rates45 does not imply a cause of action for recovery of overcharges.
46
The Court based its decision on the conclusion that since such an action
was expressly provided for in Parts I (railroads) 47 and III (water
carriers) 48 of the Interstate Commerce Act, the legislative intent in
regard to Part II (motor carriers) 49 was to deny the remedy.50  In
39. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
40. See Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action from Federal Statutes: Am-
trak and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 53 (1976).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
42. 422 U.S. at 69.
43. id. at 78.
44. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
45. 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1970), which remains unchanged since the time the case
was decided, provides in pertinent part that:
All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered by any com-
mon carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign commerce in the
transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid or in connection therewith
shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such
service or any part thereof, is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.
46. 359 U.S. at 472. Cf. Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 1069
(10th Cir. 1976) (Federal Aviation Act provision barring an air carrier from charging
more than the rates and charges specified in the carrier's tarrifs does not create an im-
plied cause of action in passengers who are overcharged).
47. 49 U.S.C. § 1-300 (1970).
48. Id. H9 901-923.
49. Id. § 301-327.
50. 359 U.S. at 470-71. The Court also relied on the failure of Congress to enact
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1965, six years after the decision in T.I.M.E. was announced, Congress
reacted by amending the Motor Carrier Act to provide an action to
recover overcharges. 51
As to the existence of an implied cause of action under section
404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.5 2 that "it
is well settled that a private damage action is available to remedy viola-
tions of this provision."5  One of the principal cases that underlied
the Nader court's assumption that the question of implication under sec-
tion 404(b) had been answered was Wills v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.514 In that case plaintiff made and confirmed a reservation on
defendant's flight. However, since defendant had "overbooked"' 5 the
flight, plaintiff was not allowed to board.50 The District Court for the
Southern District of California, after finding that defendant's actions
had reached the level of unjust discrimination prohibited by the
statute, 57 concluded that a cause of action was implied in plaintiff's
amendments to Part II suggested by the Interstate Commerce Commission that would
have expressly provided this remedy. Id. at 471-72.
51. Congress passed Act of Sept. 6, 1965, Pub. L. No. 83-170, § 6, 79 Stat. 648
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 304(a) (2), (5) (1970)), to provide this remedy.
52. 512 F.2d. 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1978
(1976). In this case, plaintiff was not allowed to board defendant's flight even though
he held a confirmed reservation. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging
both section 404(b) and common law misrepresentation causes of action. The district
court allowed him to recover on the basis of both of these claims. 365 F. Supp. 128,
132 (D.D.C. 1973). On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the section
404(b) cause of action for further findings of fact, and ordered that the common law
misrepresentation cause be stayed pending a decision by the Civil Aeronautics Board on
the question whether defendant's policy of overbooking flights was a deceptive practice.
512 F.2d at 552. The only issue appealed to the Supreme Court was the correctness
of the District of Columbia Circuit's order to stay proceedings on the misrepresentation
claim, and it was on this issue that the Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia
Circuit. 96 S. Ct. at 1981.
53. 512 F.2d at 537.
54. 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Accord, Archibald v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc,,
229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956); Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.
111 1969).
55. "Overbooking" refers to the standard practice among airlines of selling and
confirming more tickets than there are seats on the airplane. This is done in order to
maximize the number of passengers on flights while, at the same time, allowing ticket
purchasers a great degree of freedom to cancel their reservations without incurring a
penalty. See the District of Columbia Circuit's discussion of this practice in Nader, 512
F.2d at 533-37.
56. 200 F. Supp. at 362. The airline did not allow plaintiff, a tourist class ticket-
holder, to board, in order to accommodate a first-class passenger in the tourist section.
57. Id. at 365. This does not mean that every instance in which a passenger hold-
ing a confirmed reservation is denied a seat is a per se violation of section 404(b). 512
F.2d at 538. Airlines are required by an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 14
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favor.1 The basis for the holding in Wills was that the Federal
Aviation Act only provided measures to insure future complicance with
the statute and without implication of a private cause of action the anti-
discrimination provision "would be robbed of vitality and the purposes
of the Act substantially thwarted."5
A more recent case involving section 404(b) is Polansky v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.60 in which the Third Circuit held that passengers
who had alleged discrimination in the quality of ground services pro-
vided by the defendant airline6 did not have a remedy implied by sec-
tion 404(b).62 In reaching this result the court noted that a remedy
had been properly implied under section 404(b) in the overbooking
cases6" but concluded that the factors set out by the Supreme Court
in Cort v. Ash precluded implication of a remedy in this case.64 While
the Third Circuit premised its holding on the impropriety of implying
a remedy in this instance, the true basis for the result appears to be
plaintiffs' failure to allege conduct that violated section 404(b).6 5 In
determining what constituted discrimination under the statute, the
Polansky court stated that it is "discriminatory denial of access to air
facilities . . .which is critical."66  The court concluded that the air-
line's actions amounted only to breach of a contract of service, which
left plaintiffs with an action on the contract under appropriate state law
but did not allow them access to the federal courts under section
404(b). If the breach of contract by defendant in Polansky were
viewed as discrimination condemned by the statute, the Third Circuit
speculated that "It]here would always be another unbreached contract
to which the disgruntled air passenger could compare the services per-
C.F.R. § 250.3 (1976), to "establish and enforce nondiscriminatory priority rules" to
determine who should be seated when a flight is overbooked. 512 F.2d at 538. In order
to make out a case of unjust discrimination, a passenger must allege "(1) that [he] pos-
sessed a designated priority, and (2) that the carrier boarded persons with a lower pri-
ority . . . ." Id.
58. 200 F. Supp. at 365.
59. Id. at 364.
60. 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 333. Plaintiffs were part of a tour sponsored by defendant airline. They
claimed that their "first class" hotel accommodations were inferior to those provided to
other members of the tour at tourist rates. Id.
62. Id. at 338.
63. Id. at 335. See note 52 and text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
64. 523 F.2d at 335-36. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
65. The Third Circuit stated that: "[tihe words of the statute and the decided
cases suggest that (section 404(b)] does not seek to prevent the harm alleged by these
plaintiff-appellants." 523 F.2d at 336.
66. Id.
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formed for him" and section 404(b) would provide a federal remedy
for every violation of a contract of service by an airline.
67
Apart from section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, there
have been few developments in the area of punitive damages in implied
rights of action under federal statutes.68 In Wills such damages were
assessed against defendant on the theory that since punitive damages
are a possibility in common law tort actions, they are also available when
a statutory cause of action sounds in tort."' The court enunciated the
purposes served by punitive damages as being to vindicate the right of
plaintiff and to deter similar conduct by "supplement[ing] the criminal
and in futuro remedial provisions of the Act . . ... Nader, while
refusing to allow punitive damages because of a failure of proof of mali-
cious conduct by defendant airline,7 did not reject the holding in Wills
that such damages can be properly awarded in an implied action under
section 404(b). 72  The Nader opinion, however, questioned the extent
to which deterrence can be used as a justification for allowing punitive
damages without infringing upon the primary jurisdiction of the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
73
A provision of the Motor Carrier Act that could affect the
availability of punitive damages in a section 216(d) action is the Car-
mack Amendment.74 The essence of this section is that a motor carrier
67. Id.
68. Punitive damages have been awarded in an implied action under section 10(b)
of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Pe-
troleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969). But see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). See generally Note,
Punitive Damages in Implied Actions for Fraud Under the Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL
L. REV. 646 (1970).
69. 200 F. Supp. at 367.
70. Id. at 368.
71. In Wills, the requisite degree of malicious conduct was established by defend-
ant's intentional violation of its priority rules in favoring a first class ticketholder over
plaintiff and by the fact that the overbooking could be characterized as substantial. Id.
at 367. While it is arguable that the overbooking in Nader was also substantial, the
court held that if there had been a violation of defendant's priority rules, it was not in-
tentional and therefore could not be construed as malicious. 512 F.2d at 550.
72. 512 F.2d at 550.
73. Nader intimates that, if the courts award punitive damages in order to force
the airlines to end the practice of overbooking, they have infringed upon the primary
jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board first to consider the propriety of airline poli-
cies. Id.
74. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970), made applicable to Part II (motor carriers) of
the Interstate Commerce Act by id. § 319, provides in pertinent part:
Any common carrier . . . receiving property for transporation . shall
be liable . . . for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it
. and any such common carrier . . . shall be liable . . . for the full actual
loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it. . . notwithstanding any
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accepting goods for transport must issue a bill of lading to the shipper
that establishes the issuing carrier's responsibility for the goods during
the entire time they are in transit. While the Carmack Amendment
establishes a limitation on liability when a carrier files a value based
tariff with the Interstate Commerce Commission, its main purpose is
not to limit the carrier's liability, but rather to provide the shipper with
a readily available source of recovery. 75 The amendment could be
construed as a roadblock to recovery of punitive damages in that its lan-
guage states that a carrier "shall be liable . . . for the full actual loss,
damage, or injury to such property .... While a technical inter-
pretation of "actual" and "to such property" might possibly lead to the
conclusion that punitive damages are precluded by the Carmack
Amendment, the courts have refrained from such a literal reading.
77
The significance of the Hubbard decision is its invigoration of the
Motor Carrier Act's dormant antidiscrimination provision. The Fourth
Circuit added substance to the mere words of the congressional enact-
ment by implying a cause of action for a violation of section 216(d)
that carries with it the possibility of a punitive damage award. Without
such an implied remedy, a shipper suffering unjust discrimination at
the hands of a carrier would be left to bring suit for breach of contract,
an action in which actual damages are likely to be small 78 and punitive
damages generally unavailable.
79
An analysis of the reasoning in Hubbard begins with an iiquiry
into the soundness of the court's reliance on section 404(b) precedent.
While the language of sections 216(d) and 404(b) is substantially the
same, and they are both parts of regulatory acts governing common car-
riers, the Hubbard situation can be distinguished from the section
404(b) overbooking cases on the basis that it involved discrimination
against property rather than against people. The Fourth Circuit merely
limitation of liability or limitation of the amount of recovery or representation
or agreement as to value in any. . . receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract,
rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion; and any such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which
it is sought to be made is declared to be unlawful and void ....
75. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 199-203 (1911).
76. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970).
77. See Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936);
New York, P. & N.R.R. v. Peninsula Exch., 240 U.S. 34 (1916). These cases were cited
in the Hubbard opinion. 540 F.2d at 1227.
78. In Wills, actual damages amounted to only $1.54. 200 F. Supp. at 367.
79. Plaintiffs in Hubbard sought punitive damages on the basis of defendant's
breach of contract. Brief for Appellant at 28, Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 540
F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1976), but the court's failure to consider this claim in the opinion
evidences the amount of credence generally given to such an argument.
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states in conclusory terms that this distinction is not valid,80 but the
court could have supported its conclusion by citing the language of
other provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. The Act regulates transpor-
tation of both freight and people81 and makes certain provisions
expressly applicable to only one of these categories.8 It is significant
that parts of section 216 apply only to "carrier[s] of passengers"8' 3 or
"carrier[s] of property"8 4 while section 216(d) contains no such limita-
tion.8
5
Although the section 404(b) overbooking cases provide a valid
argument for implication of a remedy in Hubbard, the Fourth Circuit
could have augmented the persuasiveness of its decision on this issue
by also considering the impact of the four factors set out by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.86 Such an analysis would have been
highly relevant because the section 404(b) cases upon which the
Hubbard court placed exclusive reliance either preceded the Supreme
Court's tightening of the implication doctrine in Cort or ignored that
decision altogether.
The requirement, first stated in Texas & Pacific Railroad and
restated in Cort, that plaintiff be "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, '8 7 presents no real problem for impli-
cation of a shipper's action under section 216(d). The Motor Carrier
Act represents "a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relation-
ship between the plaintiff class and the defendant class . . ." and thus
places a shipper in the benefited position.88
The second Cort factor, the existence of legislative intent either
to create or to deny a remedy, is not so readily overcome. While the
legislative history, like the Motor Carrier Act itself, is silent on the
matter of a private damage remedy in favor of a shipper for a violation
of section 216(d)'s nondiscrimination provision, the Supreme Court's
holding in T.I.M.E. could be advanced to support a conclusion that con-
gressional silence evidenced an intent that there be no implied
remedy.8 9 Discrimination in service, like charging unjust rates, is pro-
80. 540 F.2d at 1226.
81. 49 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1970).
82. See statutes cited notes 83 & 84 infra.
83. 49 U.S.C. § 316(a) (1970).
84. Id. §§ 316(b), (c).
85. Id. § 316(d) is applicable to "any common carrier by motor vehicle."
86. 523 F.2d at 335-36; see text accompanying note 43 supra.
87. 241 U.S. at 39.
88. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975).
89. See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
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hibited and a private right of action is expressly provided to redress
such a violation in Parts I (railroads) 9" and III (water carriers) 91 of
the Interstate Commerce Act. However, the Fourth Circuit could
possibly have escaped from the meaning that T.I.M.E. drew from
congressional silence by finding an expression of legislative intent in
the 1965 amendment to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act (motor
carriers) that expressly provides the remedy sought by plaintiff in
T.I.M.E.02  While this amendment only provides a remedy for over-
charges, it could nevertheless be viewed as expressing an intent that
the remedies under Part II be the same as those provided in Parts I
and III of the Interstate Commerce Act.93
An examination of the third Cort factor, whether implication is
"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme,"94
supports the result reached in Hubbard. The Motor Carrier Act was
passed in order to regulate a rapidly growing industry. The aim of
regulation was not only to protect carriers from the unbridled competi-
tion of other carriers and the railroads from the competition of an
unregulated mode of transport, but also to protect shippers from being
damaged by the conditions that chaotic competition nurtured.9" Thus,
implication of a remedy in favor of a shipper under section 216(d)
furthers a primary purpose of the Act.
Whether Hubbard implied a remedy that is "traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States""6 and
thus violated the final Cort requirement is unclear. Polansky indicated
90. 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1970) prohibits discrimination and id. §§ 8 & 9 expressly
provide for an action in the federal courts.
91. Id. § 905(c) prohibits discrimination and id. § 908(c) expressly provides an
action in the federal courts.
92. Pub. L. No. 89-170, 79 Stat. 648 (1965) (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
93. See Letter from Charles A. Webb to Oren Harris, March 29, 1965, reprinted
in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2939. This letter was written by the chairman
of the Interstate Commerce Commission at the request of the House of Representatives
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to justify the amendment of 49 U.S.C.
§ 304(a). The letter stated:
The Motor Carrier industry has attained stature and stability as one of
the chief agencies of public transportation, handling a substantial volume of
the Nation's traffic. It seems appropriate, therefore, that shippers should have
the same rights of recovery against motor carriers as they have against rail and
water carriers for violations of the act.
Id. at 2940.
94. 422 U.S. at 78.
95. S. Rep. No. 482, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935). The report stated that "[the]
present chaotic transportation conditions are not satisfactory to investors, labor, ship-
pers, or the carriers themselves." Id. at 2.
96. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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that the overbooking cases complied with this stricture because "federal
regulatory control" in the area of boarding priority is total and thus
without implication of a federal remedy a bumped passenger would
have no action at ally 7 The total control exercised by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board distinguishes the section 404(b) cases from section
216(d) as there is no similar degree of control exercised by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. This difference, however, should not
lead to the automatic conclusion that implication is improper under sec-
tion 216(d). The Cort opinion itself cast a significant degree of doubt
on the importance of this factor in relation to the first three by recog-
nizing that in some instances state law will be supplemented by implied
federal actions in order to avoid frustration of the congressional intent
behind the particular statute-"
While the Hubbard court's finding that a private cause of action
is implicit in section 216(d) is highly significant, the court left the ulti-
mate importance of its decision in doubt by choosing not to resolve the
question of what constitute the proper elements of this cause of
action.99 It is clear from the text of section 216(d) that unjust dis-
crimination must be alleged, but this conclusion merely leads to a more
difficult inquiry into what is meant by unjust discrimination. Hubbard's
reference to the discussion in Nader of the elements of a section
404(b) cause of action' 00 is not directly helpful. Nader held that a
prima facie case of unjust discrimination is established when an air car-
rier violates its own priority rules and boards a passenger with a prior-
ity lower than that of the person claiming discrimination.101 Since
motor carriers are not required to establish priority rules, a section
216(d) action cannot be alleged in these terms. However, Polansky
illuminates this problem in relation to section 216(d) by interpreting
the Nader requirement that priority rules be violated as meaning that
denial of access to the carrier's facilities is necessary to make out a case
of unjust discrimination. 1 2  Thus, plaintiffs in Hubbard face the
prospect that, on remand, the district court will hold that they failed
to allege the elements of a section 216(d) cause of action because the
conduct that they attribute to defendant amounts to a poor performance
97. 523 F.2d at 338.
98. 422 U.S. at 85.
99. 540 F.2d at 1226 n.1.
100. Id.
101. 512 F.2d at 538. See note 57 supra.
102. 523 F.2d at 336.
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of its contractual duties but not a discriminatory denial of access to its
transport facilities.
An analysis of the Hubbard decision on the issue of punitive dam-
ages focuses on the court's conclusion that section 404(b) damages
precedent is applicable and controlling. The Fourth Circuit presents
a strong case based on statutory interpretation and policy considera-
tions for not precluding punitive damages on the basis of the Carmack
Amendment.'0 3 In contrast, the court's basis for distinguishing its
holding in Chandler is not so convincing. Although Chandler did in
fact involve a common law rather than a statutory claim, this distinction
should not control the availability of punitive damages in light of the
fact that the theoretical justification for such an award in a statutory
claim is that punitive damages are available in a common law action.
104
A better reason for distinguishing Chandler is that it does not really
concern the issue of punitive damages.' 0 5
The Hubbard court's recognition of an implied cause of action with
a possibility of punitive damages under section 216(d) was a reason-
able exercise of judicial interpretation of a statute. Implication of this
remedy promotes the just result that the rights of persons subjected to
unjust discrimination in contravention of the public policy expressed in
section 216(d) are recognized and safeguarded in the federal courts.
The critical weakness of the Hubbard decision, however, is its failure
to perceive that, although implication of a section 216(d) cause of
action is valid, the facts of the case before the court clearly revealed
that there was no discrimination. Instead of avoiding the question of
the elements of the cause of action, the Fourth Circuit should have held
that discriminatory denial of access to the carrier's facilities is necessary
to constitute discrimination under section 216(d).
GEORGE H. MASTERSON
103. 540 F.2d at 1247-48.
104. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
105. The facts of the Chandler case centered around the existence of a disputed bill
of lading. Punitive damages were not mentioned until the next to the last paragraph
of the opinion where the court stated in conclusory terms that they were unavailable
and cited the Carmack Amendment and four cases. 374 F.2d at 137. None of these
cases involved allegations of malicious conduct on the part of carriers and requests for
punitive damages, but rather all were concerned with the general rule for computing the
shipper's actual damages when a carrier has made faulty performance of his contractual
obligations. The cases cited in Chandler are Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Texas Packing Co.,
244 U.S. 31 (1917); Stackpole Motor Transport, Inc. v. Maiden Spinning & Dyeing Co.,
263 F.2d 47 (lst Cir. 1958); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Rouw Co., 258 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.
1958); Illinois Cen. R.R. v. Zucchero, 221 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1955).
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